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CHAPTER THREE 
How Demanding Should Equality of 
Opportunity Be, and How Much 
Have We Achieved? 
Valentino Dardanoni, Gary S. Fields, John E. Roemer, 
Maria Laura Sanchez Puerta 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter proposes tests of various notions of equality of opportunity and 
applies them to intergenerational income data for the United States and 
Britain. Agreement is widespread that equality of opportunity holds in a so-
ciety if the chances that individuals have to succeed depend only on their 
own efforts and not on extraneous circumstances that may inhibit or expand 
those chances. What is contentious, however, is what constitutes "effort" 
and "circumstances." Most people, we think, would say that the social con-
nections of an individual's parents would be included among circumstances: 
equality of opportunity is incomplete if some individuals get ahead because 
they have well-connected parents. This and other channels through which 
circumstances affect income opportunities in an intergenerational context 
are discussed in Section 2. 
Section 3 then formulates four, increasingly stringent criteria for equality 
of opportunity. In Section 4, we turn to an empirical implementation of these 
criteria to test for equality of opportunity in the United States and Britain. The 
results, presented in Section 5, provide only the weakest of support for equal-
ity of opportunity in the United States and no support at all in Britain. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
2. CIRCUMSTANCES, EFFORT, RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
CHANNELS FOR TRANSMISSION OF GPPORTUNITY 
Recently, one of the authors has attempted to formalize a general concep-
tion of equality of opportunity, conceived of as "leveling the playing field" 
59 
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(Roemer 1998,2002). Five words comprise the language of that approach. 
The objective is the aspect of well-being for which the policymaker or soci-
ety wants to equalize opportunities. In this chapter, the objective is the wage-
earning capacity of individuals. Circumstances are the aspects of the envi-
ronments of individuals that affect their achievement of the objective, and 
for which the society in question, or the policymaker, does not wish to hold 
individuals responsible. A type is the set of individuals in the society who 
share the same circumstances. Effort comprises the totality of actions of the 
individual that affect his or her achievement of the objective, and for which 
society does hold the individual responsible. Finally, the instrument is the 
policy that can be manipulated in order to change the value of the objective. 
We are now ready to define the core concept of this chapter, namely, 
equality of opportunity (EOp). We shall say that equality of opportunity has 
been achieved when all those who expend the same degree of effort, regard-
less of their type, have the same chances of achieving the objective. In terms 
of the preceding language, EOp holds that differences in the values of the ob-
jective are ethically acceptable if they are due to differential effort but not if 
they are due to differential circumstances. 
An equal opportunity policy is a value of the instrument that makes it 
the case that the achievement of the objective of individuals shall be a func-
tion only of their efforts, not of their circumstances. In other words, the in-
strument is used to compensate fully those with disadvantageous circum-
stances, so that, in the end, they have the same chances of acquiring high 
values of the objective as do those with advantageous circumstances. 
In this chapter, we discuss four channels through which circumstances 
affect income opportunities in an intergenerational context: 
Cl. Parents affect the chances of their children through provision of 
social connections. 
C2. Parents affect the chances of their children through formation of 
beliefs and skills in children through family culture and investment. 
C3. Parents affect the chances of their children through genetic transmis-
sion of native ability. 
C4. Parents affect the chances of their children through the instillation of 
preferences and aspirations in children. 
Various notions of equality of opportunity are based on the ethical ob-
server's choice of which of these channels to regard as circumstances and 
which are subsumed under effort. 
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3. FOUR LEVELS OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
We have listed the four channels for transmission of opportunity-social 
connections, beliefs and skills, native ability, and preferences and aspira-
tions-in what we believe most of us would choose as the right order for 
nested inclusion in the set of circumstances. We think that nearly all observers 
would regard differential family connections as a circumstance outside of the 
control of the individual. A somewhat smaller number of observers would be 
likely also to count a person as unfairly disadvantaged because of having been 
raised in a family that inculcated the children with pessimistic beliefs about 
what they could become, or that did not invest in their skills. Probably a 
smaller number still would also say that the children are not responsible for 
low innate ability. Finally, we think that few observers would treat the pref-
erences and aspirations of children as falling outside their control. 
We do not wish to be dogmatic about the ordering of these four chan-
nels and can see how some observers might wish to reverse the order of the 
last two. The reason that "family influence on preferences" is listed as the 
last channel is that we think that most people would say that an adult should 
be responsible for his preferences-in particular, with regard to pursuit of 
economic opportunities-even if those preferences are in large part the con-
sequence of his upbringing. As one influential philosopher has written, a per-
son should be held responsible for his preferences if and when he is glad he 
has them (Dworkin 1981). This definition excludes addictions and compul-
sions, which are preferences one would prefer not to have, but not income-
occupational choice preferences, even if they were instilled in childhood. We 
shall denote by pS those preferences that the individual has that are attribut-
able to the self (hence the superscript "S"). In our analysis, the individual is 
always held responsible for these preferences. This is to be contrasted with 
the preferences that the individual has because of family influences, for 
which he or she mayor may not be held responsible. 
For the sake of argument, let us make two assumptions: first, that the 
four kinds of circumstances listed exhaust the set of parental influences on 
child incomes, and second, that the set of parental influences is "nested" in 
the preceding order, with regard to arguable inclusion in the set of circum-
stances for EOp policy. If so, then we have four associated conceptions of 
equality of opportunity, associated with four possible sets of circumstances: 
EOpl: Circumstances = {Cl}. Effort = {C2, C3, C4, pSI. 
62 How Much Mobility? 
EOp2: Circumstances = {Cl, C2}. Effort = {C3, C4, pS}. 
EOp3: Circumstances = {Cl, C2, C3}. Effort = {C4, pS}. 
EOp4: Circumstances = {Cl, C2, C3, C4}. Effort = IPs}. 
Thus, when X is the number of channels designated as circumstances, EOpX 
denotes equality of opportunity when there are X channels. 
4. TESTING THREE LEVELS OF EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY 
A. Three Tests 
As we do not have data that permit us to test for the effect of parental social 
connections, we will henceforth ignore EOp 1. The tests for equality of op-
portunity at the other levels (EOpX, X = 2,3,4) proceed as follows. 
Let Y denote the outcome variable and let m(.) denote a function or sta-
tistic by which the outcome variable is judged-for example, the cumulative 
distribution function or the mean of Y. Let j = 1, ... , J be the values of the 
C2 channels, k = 1, ... , K the values of the C3 channels, and l = 1, ... , L 
the values of the C4 channels. 
The most demanding criterion for equality of opportunity is EOp4. This 
test maintains that the distribution of the outcomes should be the same for 
all (social connections), beliefs and skills, native ability, and preferences and 
aspirations groups. That is: 
Test of EOp4: Are the numbers m;kL all the same, 
for all values of (j, k, I)? (1) 
If individuals are held to be responsible for the family-induced prefer-
ences and aspirations (C4) but not for the other intergenerational transmis-
sion channels (C1-C3), we move to the EOp3 criterion. The test for EOp3 
maintains that the distribution of outcomes should be the same for all (so-
cial connections), beliefs and skills, and native ability groups within a pref-
erences and aspirations category. In other words: 
Test of EOp3: For each choice of I, are the numbers 
(m;kL II fixed, j = 1, ... J, k = 1, ... , K) the same? (2) 
Suppose that individuals are also held responsible for native ability. 
We then have the EOp2 criterion, the test for which is that the distribution 
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of outcomes should be the same for all (social connections and) beliefs and 
skills groups. The corresponding test is then: 
Test of EOp2: For each choice of I and k, are the numbers 
{mjkll/, k fixed, j = 1, ... ,]l the same? (3) 
As noted earlier, EOp4 is a more demanding criterion than most observers, 
we think, hold. 
One final remark: we take it as axiomatic that no ethical observer would 
hold individuals responsible for the consequence of their parents' social con-
nections or lack thereof. To hold individuals responsible for everything 
about their environments would comprise the extremely laissez-faire view 
that any person, regardless of his situation, can "pull himself up by his boot-
straps," and so equality of opportunity would require only antidiscrimina-
tion legislation. 
B. The U.S. and British Data Sets 
These tests for equality of opportunity are performed on data for the United 
States and Britain. In the case of the United States, we use the Wisconsin Lon-
gitudinal Study (WLS). This is a long-term study of a random sample of 
10,317 men and women who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 
1957. Survey data were collected from the original respondents or their par-
ents in 1957, 1964, 1975, and 1992. These data provide a full record of social 
background, youthful aspirations, schooling, military service, family forma-
tion, labor market experiences, and social participation of the original re-
spondents. The survey data from earlier years have been supplemented by 
mental ability tests, measures of school performance, and characteristics of 
communities of residence, schools and colleges, and employers and industries. 
The WLS sample is broadly representative of white, non-Hispanic American 
men and women who have completed at least a high school education. Among 
Americans aged 50 to 54 in 1990 and 1991, approximately 66 percent are 
non-Hispanic white persons who completed at least 12 years of schooling. 
In the case of Britain, we use the National Child Development Survey 
(NCDS) and the British Cohort Survey (BCS). These data sets are two UK 
cohort studies targeting the population born in the UK respectively between 
3-9 March 1958 and between 5-11 April 1970. Individuals were surveyed 
at different stages of their life, and information on their parental background 
was collected. The latest NCDSs were conducted in 1981, 1991, and 1999 
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when the cohort members were aged 23, 33, and 41, while the latest BCS 
was conducted in 1999. 
In implementing these tests on u.s. and British data, the outcome vari-
able is the individual's monthly income in the United States, and hourly wage 
in the UK. In the United States, we have two income variables y. The princi-
pal income variable for our analysis, Yio is the labor market earnings of the 
individual high school graduate in 1992, which is the most recent round of 
the survey. The data set also includes, for the household that the individual 
lives in, the income from the labor market and other sources. This total in-
come, expressed on a per capita basis, is our second {ncome variable Y2' In 
the case of Britain, the data set only provides information on individual la-
bor market hourly wage, which is the sole outcome variable for our analysis. 
The explanatory variables for the two countries are similar. Beliefs and 
skills are proxied by parents' education. Preferences and aspirations are prox-
ied by individual's education. Native ability is proxied by individual's IQ. 
Before continuing, we comment on the commonly used test for equality 
of opportunity, which is to ask if the distribution of outcomes among chil-
dren is independent of parents' outcome values, using as test whether the 
rows of the intergenerational transition matrix are equal. This test implies 
taking EOp4 as the appropriate definition of equality of opportunity. How-
ever, as we have suggested, most ethical observers would probably not en-
dorse EOp4 as the appropriate notion of equal opportunity, and hence the 
usual test is far too demanding, as it is not associated with an ethical view 
that many people hold. 
We turn now to two approaches for relating the outcome variables to 
the explanatory variables. 
C. Implementing the Tests by Quantile Regression 
In our first empirical approach, we use quantile regression to check the four 
hypotheses considered in this chapter. Quantile regression differs from ordi-
nary regression in the following way. In ordinary regression, the regression 
equation gives the mean of the outcome variable conditional on the ex-
planatory variables: 
Y mean I A, E, PE = a + b A + cE + dPE. 
Quantile regression, in contrast, provides an equation for the qth quantile of 
the conditional distribution. Thus, the equation for the conditional median is 
= 
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In this study, we estimate the conditional distribution of the outcome vari-
able Y at four different quantiles, q = 0.20, 0040, 0.60, and 0.80, and see 
how the conditional distribution of Y depends on the conditioning variables 
in correspondence of the chosen quantiles. Let 
Yq I A, E, PE = aq + bq A + cqE + dqPE. q = 0.20,0.40,0.60, 0.80 
denote the conditional quantiles of the outcome variable, conditional on 
individual's education, individual's ability, and parents' education. Positive 
values of bq, cq, and dq mean that higher values of ability, education, or par-
ents' education raise income at the qth quantile of the conditional income 
distribution. It is possible, and indeed our results below show, that bq, cq, 
and dq are not all positive at all quantiles of the distribution. 
Turning now to tests for equality of opportunity, the three tests can be 
implemented with the following quantile regression equations: 
Test of EOp4: For all q's, bq = cq = dq = 0. 
Test of EOp3: For all q's, cq = dq = 0. 
Test of EOp2: For all q's,dq = 0. 
(1") 
(2a ) 
(3") 
The advantage of quantile regression over ordinary regression is that the 
former provides a test for whether the distributions of the outcome variable 
are independent of various circumstances, instead of whether the means of 
those distributions are independent of circumstances. 
Implementing the Tests Nonparametrically 
In our second empirical approach, we dichotomize the parental education, 
ability, and individual education variables in order to have a small number 
of different populations that can be directly compared in a nonparametric 
fashion. 
We implement the three dichotomous variables in the following ways. 
The first thing that the approach turns on is the implementation of beliefs 
and skills. We create two categories of parents, "advantaged" and "disadvan-
taged." In both countries, parents' education is expressed as the average of 
the education level of the two parents. In the United States, the advantaged 
parents are those who averaged at least a high school diploma. In Britain, the 
dividing line between advantaged and disadvantaged parents is the median of 
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average education, 9.5 years. The second concept that we use is individual's 
native ability. We distinguish two "ability" groups, gauged by the score on 
an IQ test, and call them "highly able" and "less able" according to whether 
they fall above or below the median. Third, the approach identifies two 
different groups for preferences and aspirations, according to the education 
of the individual. In the United States, the "high preference" individuals are 
those with one or more year of college. In Britain, those with A-level educa-
tion or higher are regarded as "high preference" and those with O-level 
education or less are regarded as "low preference." 
Accordingly, the three equality of opportunity tests, in decreasing order 
of stringency, are: 
Test of EOp4: For eight parents' education/IQ/individual's 
education groups, m1l1 := mU2 = ... = m222' (1 b) 
Test of EOp3: For each individual's education group, the mean 
incomes are the same for each parents' education/IQ 
group: mlll = m12l = m21l = m221 I = 1,2. (2b) 
Test of EOp2: For each individual's education/IQ group, 
the mean incomes are the same for each parents' education 
group: mlkl = mlkll k = 1, 2, I = 1, 2. (3b) 
To test for the three levels of equality of opportunity EOp2, EOp3, and 
EOp4, we perform a main test and a number of robustness tests. The main 
test uses individual labor earnings Yl as the outcome variable of interest and 
compares the means p.. of the eight distribution functions. 
The robustness tests use different income variables or different statistics. 
The first and second robustness tests compare median individual earnings 
and CDFs of individual earnings instead of means. Finally, the third and 
fourth tests compare mean incomes per capita, Y2, for the United States and 
mean log-earnings instead of earnings in dollars for both countries. 
5. RESULTS 
A. First Set of Results: Quantile Regression 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the results of the estimation of the conditional 
quantile regressions for the two countries. Table 3.1 reveals that all 
coefficients are significantly positive for all quantiles. Thus, all three equal-
ity of opportunity hypotheses are strongly rejected for the UK. On the other 
Constant 
Ability 
Education 
Parents' ed. 
20TH QUANTILE 
Coefficient Std Error 
1.33 
.080 
.170 
.011 
.032*** 
.006*** 
.006*** 
.003**" 
TABLE 3.1 
Quantile Regression Results for the UK 
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Wage 
40TH QUANTILE 60TH QUANTILE 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
1.59 .049*** 1.77 .043""" 
.090 .006**" .091 .007* * * 
.164 .006*"" .144 .005* '''' 
.007 .005 .011 .004" * ,-
*, ;} *, * * * mean 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance. 
80TH QUANTILE 
Coefficient Std Error 
1.97 .048'- * * 
.092 .010*'-* 
.122 .007*** 
.017 .005*** 
Constant 
Ability 
Education 
Parents' ed. 
TABLE 3.2 
Quantile Regression Results for the United States 
Dependent Variable: Earnings 
20TH QUANTILE 40TH QUANTILE 60TH QUANTILE 
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
-32.413 3,483.6**" -35,511 2,487.9*"* -32,059 2,949.3"** 
21.7 9.5** 44.9 13.7**" 61.9 16.2*"* 
3,112.3 266.7*** 4,304.5 236.8*** 4,427.7 232.7"** 
-434.8 96.9**" -498.6 153.3*** -35.8" 176.9 
*, * *, ,;. * * mean 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance. 
80TH QUANTILE 
Coefficient Std Error 
-46,891 5,269.8*** 
98.1 19.7*** 
5,966.6 406.7*** 
744.4 279.0**" 
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hand, the results for the United States presented in Table 3.2 are somewhat 
mixed. Individual's own education and own ability always exhibit statisti-
cally significant positive effects. Thus, EOp4 and EOp3 are strongly re-
jected. However, parents' education exhibits mixed effects. The coefficients 
are significantly negative at the 20th and 40th percentile of the conditional 
earnings distribution, statistically insignificant at the 60th percentile of the 
conditional earnings distribution, and significantly positive at the 80th per-
centile of the conditional earnings distribution. Thus, the hypothesis that 
parents' education, after conditioning on own education and ability, has no 
effect on children's outcome is strongly rejected. However, the rejection is 
in an unexpected direction, with profound differences between the lower 
and higher sections of the conditional distribution. 
In summary, the results using the quantile regression method are that 
(1) we reject equality of opportunity as defined by EOp4 and EOp3 for both 
countries, (2) we reject equality of opportunity as defined by EOp2 for 
Britain, and (3) our results do not permit us to conclude whether EOp2 
holds for the U.S. population described by our data. 
B. Second Set of Results: Nonparametric Approach 
In this subsection we present the results for the tests of equality of oppor-, 
tunity with the nonparametri<;; approach. We begin with the results for the 
main tests, from the most stringent to the least, followed by the results of the 
robustness tests performed. The United States results using this method are 
presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the British results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
The result for the main tests for EOp3 and EOp4 is that we reject the 
null hypothesis at the 1 percent level of significance. This result is the same 
for both the United States and Britain. 
The results for the main test for EOp2 differ for the United States and 
Britain. In the case of the U.S. data set, we reject the null hypothesis at the 
5 percent level of significance but not at the 1 percent level. That is, using 
mean individual earnings in dollars, we can be 95 percent confident (but not 
99 percent confident) that equality of opportunity is rejected. However, for 
the case of Britain, the result for the main test for EOp2 is that we reject the 
null hypothesis at the 1 percent level of significance. 
In summary, the results for the main tests are that (1) we reject equality 
of opportunity as defined by EOp4and EOp3 for both countries, (2) we re-
ject equality of opportunity as defined by EOp2 for Britain, and (3) we find 
Group 1 (mean = 48,405) 
Group 2 (mean = 36,578) 
Group 3 (mean = 26,415) 
Group 4 (mean = 21,915) 
Group 5 (mean = 43,288) 
Group 6 (mean = 33,930) 
Group 7 (mean = 24,389) 
Group 8 (mean = 19,871) 
Group 1 
mean = 
48,405 
TABLE 3.3 
United States: Data for Tests of Equality of Opportunity 
MAIN TEST: COMPARISON OF MEAN EARNINGS IN DOLLARS 
Group 2 
mean = 
Group 3 Group 4 
mean = mean = 
36,578 26,415 21,915 
fl2 > fl3 ,,,, * 
fl2> fl4*'f" 
fl5 > fl2'f * * 
fl2 > fl6 
fl3> fl4*** 
fl5> fl3*"" 
fl6 > fl3*** 
Group 5 
mean = 
43,288 
Group 6 
mean = 
33,930 
Group 7 
mean = 
24,389 
~1 > 1l2*),~* 
fl1 > fl/'" 'f 
1-11> J-l4*** 
III > 115* * 
fl1 > fl6* 'f * 
fl1 > fl7*"" 
fl1 > fls'''-* 
fl2 > fl7" *" 
fl2 > fls *" 'f 
fl3 > fl7 
1-15> j.l4*** 
fl6 > 1.14*"* 
fl7 '> fl4"" 
fl4 > fls ,,"' 
fl5>fl6*"* 
fl5>fl7*"'f 
fl5> fls""* 
> *** fl6 fl7 
fl3 > fls''"'* > *** fl6 fls 
*, * *, * * * for 10, 5, 1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: means are equal. 
Group 8 
mean = 
19,871 
Group 1 
(median = 36,000) 
Group 2 
(median = 30,000) 
Group 3 
(median = 21,000) 
Group 4 
(median = 19,000) 
Group 5 
(median = 38,000) 
Group 6 
(median = 32,000) 
Group 7 
(median = 20,000) 
Group 8 
(median = 17,000) 
ROBUSTNESS TEST 1: COMPARISON OF MEDIAN EARNINGS IN DOLLARS 
Group 1 
median = 
36,000 
Group 2 
median = 
30,000 
med, > med"·" 
Group 3 
median = 
21,000 
med, > med'''" med2 > med3*'~" 
Group 4 
median = 
19,000 
med, > med"'»' med2 > med4 *" * med3 > med,' 
meds > med, meds > med2 * *'~ med4 > med3·" 
GmupS 
median = 
38,000 
Group 6 
median = 
32,000 
med, > med'·"':· med6 > med2 med6 > med3'·* med6 > Ine*** meds > med*"* 
Group 7 
median = 
20,000 
med, > med"" med2 > med7*'* med3 > med7 meds > med'»" med6 > me**" 
med, > med"" med2 > meds * "* med3 > meds*" med4 > meds meds > med'** med6 > me*** 
*, '*, *"* for 10, 5, 1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: medians are equaL 
Group 8 
median = 
17,000 
(continued) 
TABLE 3.3 
(continued) 
ROBUSTNESS TEST 2: STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE IN DOLLARS 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Group 8 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
Group 6 
Group 7 
Group 8 
1> FOD 2*** 
1>FOD3"** 
1 > FOD 4**" 
1 ~ 5 
1 ~ 6" ,,,. 
1 > FOD T""* 
1>FOD8*** 
2> SOD 3**" 
2> FOD 4*"* 
5> SOD 2**" 
2~6 
2> SOD 7""" 
2> FOD 8*** 
3> SOD 4**" 
5> FOD 3"** 
6> SOD 3*"* 
3~7 
3> FOD 8*** 
*, **, *** for 10, 5,1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: CDFs are equal. 
5> FOD 4"'''" 
6> SOD 4*"* 
7> SOD 4"** 
4 ~ 8* 
5> FOD 6""" 
5> FOD 7*** 
5> SOD 8""" 
6> SOD 8*'''' 
6> SOD 8"*'" 7> FOD 8*"* 
Group 1 (mean = 42,114) 
Group 2 (mean = 33,021) 
Group 3 (mean = 28,736) 
Group 4 (mean = 23,743) 
Group 5 (mean = 36,913) 
Group 6 (mean = 30,929) 
Group 7 (mean = 24,952) 
Group 8 (mean = 21,529) 
ROBUSTNESS TEST 3: COMPARISON OF MEAN INCOME PER CAPITA IN DOLLARS (STRICTLY POSITIVE VALUES) 
Group 1 
mean = 
Group 2 
mean = 
Group 3 
mean = 
Group 4 
mean = 
Group 5 
mean = 
Group 6 
mean = 
42,114 33,021 28,736 
111> 112*** 
111> 113"** 112>113"* 
111>114*** 112 > 114 *" * 
111> 115"** 115>112** 
111 > 116" * * 112 > 116 
111 > 117" * * 112> 117* * 
23,743 
113> 114*** 
115> 113*** 
116 > 113 
113>117*** 
36,913 30,929 
> *** 115 114 
116>114*** 
117 > 114 
115> 116*** 
115 > 117*'f 'f 
Group 7 
mean = 
24,952 
Group 8 
mean = 
21,529 
111>118*** 112 > 118 113>118*** 114>118"** > *** 115 118 
116 > 117" * * 
116> 118*** 117 > 118 * " * 
"', >I- "', >I- * * for 10, 5, 1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: means are equal. 
(continued) 
TABLE 3.3 
(continued) 
ROBUSTNESS TEST 4: COM~ARISON OF MEAN LOG-EARNINGS IN DOLLARS 
Group 1 
mean = 
Group 2 
mean = 
Group 3 
mean = 
Group 4 
mean = 
Group 5 
mean = 
9,330 8,864 8,339 7,931· 9,440 
J-ll > J-l2"" 
J-ll > J-l3**" J-l2 > J-l3"* 
J-ll > J-l4*'c* J-l2> J-l4*** J-l3> J-l4* 
J-ls > J-ll > *** J-ls J-l2 J-ls> J-l3""* > *** J-ls J-l4 
J-ll > J-l6 J-l6 > J-l2 > *** J-l6 J-l3 J-l6> J-l4*** 
> *~~* J-ll J-l7 > **:~ J-l2 J-l7 J-l7> J-l3 > ** J-l7 J-l4 
Group 6 
mean ~ 
9,147 
Group 7 
mean = 
8,342 
Group 1 (mean = 9,330) 
Group 2 (mean = 8,864) 
Group 3 (mean = 8,339) 
Group 4 (mean = 7,931) 
Group 5 (mean = 9,440) 
Group 6 (mean = 9,147) 
Group 7 (mean = 8,342) 
Group 8 (mean = 7,866) > *** J-ll J-ls J-l2 > J-ls J-l3 > J-ls"** J-l4 > J-ls > *** J-ls J-ls 
J-l6 > J-l7*** 
J-l6 > J-ls" * * 
*, '*, .** for 10, 5, 1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: means are equal. 
Group 1 = advantaged high ability high preference 
Group 2 = advantaged low ability high preference 
Group 3 = advantaged high abiliry low preference 
Group 4 = advantaged low ability low preference 
Group 5 = disadvantaged high ability high preference 
Group 6 = disadvantaged low ability high preference 
Group 7 = disadvantaged high ability low preference 
Group 8 = disadvantaged low abiliry low preference 
Group 8 
mean = 
7,866 
TABLE 3.4 
United States: Summary of Tests of Equal Opportunity 
Test of EOp4 
Test of EOp3 
Test of EOp2 
Are all 8 group means equal? 
Within a preference group, are all four ability-type 
groups equal? 
(Group 1 = Group 2 = Group 5 = Group 6 & 
Group 3 = Group 4 = Group 7 = Group 8) 
Within an ability-preference pair, are the four type 
comparisons equal? 
(Group 1 = Group 5 & Group 2 = Group 6 & 
Group 3 = Group 7 & Group 4 = Group 8) 
NOTE: "Yes" = "Cannot reject that they are equal." 
"No" = "Reject that they are equal." 
About the Tests: 
Main test: Mean earnings are equal. 
Robustness test 1: Median earnings are equal. 
Robustness test 2: CDFs are equal. 
Robustness test 3: Mean incomes per capita are equal. 
Robustness test 4: Mean log-earnings are equal. 
Group 1 = advantaged high ability high preference 
Group 2 = advantaged low ability high preference 
Group 3 = advantaged high ability low preference 
Group 4 = advantaged low ability low preference 
Group 5 = disadvantaged high ability high preference 
Group 6 = disadvantaged low ability high preference 
Group 7 = disadvantaged high ability low preference 
Group 8 = disadvantaged low ability low preference 
RESULTS OF ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
RESULTS OF 
MAIN TEST Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
No No No No 
No No No No 
Yes at the 1 % Yes at the 1 and 
level, no at the 5% level, no at 
5% level. the 10% level. Yes No 
Test 4 
No 
No 
Yes 
Group 1 (mean = 10.86) 
Group 2 (mean = 9.15) 
Group 3 (mean = 7.97) 
Group 4 (mean = 6.70) 
Group 5 (mean = 9.92) 
Group 6 (mean = 8.19) 
Group 7 (mean = 7.46) 
Group 8 (mean = 6.50) 
TABLE 3.5 
Britain: Data for Tests of Equality of Opportunity 
COMPARISON OF MEANS IN DOLLARS (EARNINGS) 
Group 1 
mean = 
Group 2 
mean = 
Group 3 
mean = 
Group 4 
mean = 
Group 5 
mean = 
Group 6 
mean = 
Group 7 
mean = 
10.86 9.15 
iJ.! > iJ.2*'·" 
\.11> 113*;;-* 
iJ.!>iJ.4*** 
\.11>115*** 
iJ.! > iJ.6""* 
iJ.! > iJ.7*** 
Ill> \.18*** 
7.97 
iJ.2 > iJ.3*** 
iJ.2 > iJ.4*"" 
iJ.5> iJ.2**" 
iJ.2> 1.l6*"* 
1l2>1l/~** 
iJ.2>iJ.8*"* 
6.70 
1-13> 1-14*** 
iJ.5 > iJ.3 ," ,'" 
iJ.6 > iJ.3 
[13> iJ.7'":' 
jl.3>j.18**:~ 
9.92 
[15> iJ.4"** 
iJ.6 > iJ.4 * * * 
[17>[1/'** 
[14 > [1s 
8.19 
iJ.5> iJ.6*** 
[15> [17**" 
1.l5 > iJ.s""* 
7.46 
[16> [17" * * 
[16> iJ.S*** 
*, * *, * * * for 10, 5, 1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: means are equal. 
Group 8 
mean = 
6.50 
Group 1 
(median = 10.34) 
Group 2 
(median = 8.82) 
Group 3 
(median = 7.16) 
Group 4 
(median = 5.97) 
Group 5 
(median = 9.44) 
Group 6 
(median = 7.85) 
Group 7 
(median = 6.69) 
Group 8 
(median = 5.96) 
Group 1 
median = 
10.34 
Group 2 
median = 
8.82 
Group 3 
median = 
7.16 
medl > med'" 
medl > med'" med2 > med/'" 
medl > med'" 
medl > med'" meds > med2 ' 
medl > med'" med2 > med'" 
med! > med'" med2 > med'" 
med! > med'" med2 > med'" 
COMPARISON OF MEDIANS IN DOLLARS 
Group 4 
median = 
5.97 
Group 5 
median = 
9.44 
meds > me'" 
Group 6 
median = 
7.85 
med6 > me'" meds > med'" 
Group 7 
median = 
6.69 
med7 > me'" meds > med'" med6 > med'" 
Group 8 
median = 
5.96 
meds > med'" med6 > med'" med7 > med"-
" •• , ••• for 10, 5, 1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: medians are equal. 
(continued) 
TABLE 3.5 
( continued) 
STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE IN DOLLARS 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Group 8 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
Group 6 
Group 7 
Group 8 
1> SOD 2*** 
1> FOD 3*** 
1> FOD 4*** 
1 - 5*** 
1> FOD 6*** 
1> FOD 7*** 
1 > FOD 8*** 
2> SOD 3*** 
2> SOD 4*** 
5> SOD 2*** 
2> SOD 6*** 
2> SOD 7*** 
2> FOD 8*** 
3 - 4*** 
5> SOD 3*** 
6>'-SOD3***· 
3 - 7** 
3> FOD 8*** 
" •• , ••• for 10,5,1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: CDFs are equal. 
5> SOD 4*** 
6> SOD 4*** 
7> SOD 4*** 
4> SOD 8 
5> SOD 6*** 
5> FOD 7*** 
5> FOD 8*** 
6> SOD 8*** 
7> FOD 8"** 7> SOD 8*** 
COMPARISON OF MEANS IN DOLLARS (LOG-EARNINGS) 
Group 1 (mean = 2.34) 
Group 2 (mean = 2.18) 
Group 3 (mean = 1.97) 
Group 4 (mean = 1.79) 
Group 5 (mean = 2.25) 
Group 6 (mean = 2.06) 
Group 7 (mean = 1.90) 
Group 8 (mean = 1.79) 
Group 1 
mean = 
Group 2 
mean = 
2.34 2.18 
Ill:> 112*** 
Ill> 113"** 
Ill> 114"** 
Ill> 115*"" 
Ill> 116**" 
Ill> 117'""" 
Ill> 118*"" 
112> 113"** 
112 > IL 4" * " 
115> 112*"" 
116> 112*"" 
112> 117'""" 
112> 118*"* 
Group 3 
mean = 
1.97 
113> 114**" 
115> 113'""" 
116>113"* 
113 > 117" * 
113>118*** 
", **, * *. for 10, 5, 1 percent significance level respectively. Ho: means are equal. 
Group 1 = advantaged high ability high preference 
Group 2 = advantaged low ability high preference 
Group 3 = advantaged high ability low preference 
Group 4 = advantaged low ability low preference 
Group 5 = disadvantaged high ability high preference 
Group 6 = disadvantaged low ability high preference 
Group 7 = disadvantaged high ability low preference 
Group 8 = disadvantaged low ability low preference 
Group 4 
mean = 
1.79 
Group 5 
mean = 
2.25 
Group 6 
mean = 
2.06 
Group 7 
mean = 
1.90 
Group 8 
mean = 
1.79 
115>114*** 
116 > 114 * *" 
117>114**" 
114 > 118 
115>116*** 
115> 117**" 
115 > 118 ,,,, * 
116 > 117" *" 
116>118**" > *** 117 118 
TABLE 3.6 
Britain: Summary of Tests of Equal Opportunity 
Test of EOp4 
Test of EOp3 
Test of EOp2 
Are all 8 group means equal? 
Within a preference group, are all four ability-type groups equal? 
Within an ability-preference pair, are the four type comparisons equal? 
NOTE: "Yes" = "Cannot rejectthatthey are equal." 
"No" = "Reject that they are equal." 
About the Tests: 
Main test: Mean earnings are equal 
Robustness test 1: Median earnings are eq ual 
Robustness test 2: CDFs are equal 
Robustness test 3: Mean log-earnings are equal. 
Group 1 = advantaged high ability high preference 
Group 2 = advantaged low ability high preference 
Group 3 = advantaged high ability low preference 
Group 4 = advantaged low ability low preference 
Group 5 = disadvantaged high ability high preference 
Group 6 = disadvantaged low ability high preference 
Group 7 = disadvantaged high ability low preference 
Group 8 = disadvantaged low ability low preference 
RESULTS OF 
MAIN TEST 
No 
No 
No 
RESULTS OF 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
No No No 
No No No 
No No No 
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weak evidence of equality of opportunity using criterion EOpl for the case 
of the United States. 
Turning now to the robustness tests, we conduct four different ones for 
each of the three criteria for equality of opportunity. In the case of Britain, 
all the available robustness tests (using median earnings, CDFs of individual 
earnings, and mean log-earnings) support the rejection of EOp4, EOp3, and 
EOp2 at all levels of significance. In the case of the United States, all the ro-
bustness tests (using median earnings, CDFs of individual earnings, mean in-
comes per capita, and mean log-earnings) support the rejection of EOp4 and 
EOp3 at all levels of significance. However, in the case of EOpl, the robust-
ness tests for the United States produce additional weak evidence in favor of 
equality of opportunity. Of the four robustness tests, one (the income per 
capita test) rejects EOpl at all significance levels, one (CDFs) rejects EOpl 
at the 10 percent significance level, and the other two (median earnings and 
mean log-earnings) do not reject EOpl at any significance level. Taken to-
gether, the main test and the four robustness tests do not decisively reject 
EOpl for the United States, but they do not provide strong evidence in fa-
vor of it either. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In market economies like those of the United States and the UK, we should 
not expect equality of opportunity for prefiscal incomes to hold when native 
ability and years of education are taken to be "circumstances." That is to 
say, one would expect prefiscal income, to be sensitive to native ability and 
years of education, and hence it is no surprise that our results imply that 
EOp3 and EOp4 do not hold in either country. 
One might, however, conjecture that the institution of public education 
would be sufficient to compensate children for parental disadvantage (as here 
proxied by the parents" educationallevel)-that is that equality of opportu-
nity in the sense of EOpl would hold. Our tests show that this is not the case 
in the UK; the results are more ambiguous with respect to the United States. 
One might cautiously suggest, based on this result, that the United States is 
a more meritocratic society than the UK, in the sense that the disadvantages 
associated with parental deficits are less important for the success of the 
child. Our data, however, are not sufficiently fine to allow us to distinguish 
between the effects of family connections and family culture on the future 
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earnings of the child. It is likely that both are important. It is nevertheless 
conceivable that, in the UK, parents pass their jobs down to their children, in 
the United States they do not, and this explains the different results for 
EOp2. It is more likely, however, that family culture is important in both 
countries; as well, perhaps the fact that private education for the wealthy is 
more institutionalized in the UK than in the United States explains the "bet-
ter" results for the United States in regard to EOp2. 
Finally, we repeat our caveat with regard to the ethical view associated 
with asking whether the rows of the intergenerational transition matrix are 
the same. As such equality could only be expected to hold if EOp4 held, 
given the fact that the joint distribution of native ability and preferences/as-
pirations differs according to parental type, demanding that kind of equality 
corresponds to a particularly radical conception of what equalizing oppor-
tunities requires. 
We hope that our discussion will stimulate others to assemble data sets 
with more precise measures of the salient characteristics of individuals and 
their families, so that tests for equality of opportunity may be performed that 
correspond to commonly held ethical views. 
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